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We describe a design of fault-tolerant features for the PANSAT communications satellite, a design which can
address a wide variety of possible faults. We discuss system errors, program errors, and data errors, each
subdivided into a variety of types. We discuss "acceptance tests" that can be used to detect faults, and the
appropriate remediation methods for each type.
This paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 2000 Command and Control Research and Technology
Symposium, Monterey, CA, June 2000.
1. Introduction
Since 1989, the Space Systems Academic Group at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) has been
developing the Petite Amateur Navy Satellite (PANSAT). PANSAT is an experimental, store-and-forward
communications satellite developed and constructed almost entirely at NPS. Classified as a microsatellite, the
spacecraft weighs 150 pounds and is nineteen inches in diameter. Using spread spectrum modulation, the
satellite will provide email, binary file transfer, and point-to-point communications to amateur radio (HAM)
users worldwide. The satellite was to be launched from the Space Shuttle and become operational in October
1998.
The PANSAT project is funded by the Navy Space Systems Division (N63). Primarily, the goal of this
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project is to be an educational tool for military officers as well as a learning experience for the Space Systems
Academic Group. However, PANSAT also serves a significant secondary purpose. Currently, the military
uses an eclectic, yet expensive, group of satellites for its communications. Many of these satellites are leased,
and most of those that are not are quickly approaching their programmed lifetime. Replacing the satellites
under the current architecture is expensive. Therefore, the Navy is evaluating the communications
capabilities of inexpensive, yet dependable, small satellites with the idea of using them to augment or replace
the current system. With this in mind, the PANSAT project is implemented with a minimum of cost, meaning
that hardware resources are limited and redundant features are minimal. The inexpensive PANSAT satellite
will be evaluated in an established communications environment to see if it can provide the reliable
functionality that the military requires. If the experiment proves successful, PANSAT may become the
cornerstone for a new military satellite communications network.
Figure 1: PANSAT
One of the difficulties with operating satellites, and one that severely impacts reliability, is that all problems
which might arise with the unit must be detected and handled either remotely or by the spacecraft itself.
Despite this difficulty, there are means of obtaining a reliable system. PANSAT?s counteractive goals of
reliability and low cost do make detecting and handling errors even more of a problem to implement.
Typically, to ensure a reliable space system, subsystems are implemented redundantly. However, this
dramatically raises the costs, a luxury that cannot be afforded in the PANSAT project.
Space itself compounds errors. In space radiation is much stronger and has more impact on the operations of
digital mechanisms. This effect, commonly referred to as "space anomalies", flips bits in digital circuits. The
effects could range from none to crashing the entire system. Another feature of operating in space is that if
one element on the satellite fails, it cannot be replaced. However, the entire mission should not be terminated
because of a single part failure. Rather the system should be able to respond and adapt to overcome the
failure using the resources available.
Fault tolerance is the means for a system to handle such errors or problems that might occur during operation.
Developing a complete and proper fault tolerance plan should enable the system to gracefully detect and
handle every type of problem that might arise during operations [Aviezienis, 1997; Somani and Vaidya,
1997]. Many different methods are involved in fault tolerance, but only the areas pertaining to the particular
situation of the PANSAT implementation need to be identified here [Lee and Anderson, 1990]. While some
fault tolerance techniques may have been applied to previous microsatellites, none has instituted as
comprehensive a plan as designed for PANSAT. Additionally, this is the initial implementation of the
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Watchdog concept, developed for PANSAT in order to conduct system evaluations.
2. System Description
Before a fault tolerance plan can be developed, a survey of the resources available to the system needs to be
conducted. PANSAT uses a space-rated Intel 80186 central processing unit (M80C186XL). While this is an
older processor, it is space-hardened, meaning that it is resistant to space anomalies. Furthermore, the 80186
is inexpensive and fully capable of handling the workload expected of it. The spacecraft has two processors;
the second processor merely monitors the first. If the first suffers a complete failure, when it shuts down due
to some other independent power control system turning off the processor, the second processor takes over
for the first.
The system has 512 kilobytes of working memory. This is error-checking volatile random access memory
(RAM). There is no redundancy of working memory; however, this memory bank uses error-correcting
Hamming codes to correct single bit flips. These codes can detect two bit flips, but not correct them. For
three of more bit flips, the errors may not be detected. For long term storage, there are two four-megabyte
memory banks. These memory banks are also volatile RAM, however they do not use an error correction
scheme. Initially, these two banks will be set up mirroring each other. If data is lost in one bank, the other
bank may still contain it. However, if the two banks disagree about the contents of the data, the system will
be unable to determine which data bank contains the correct version. The data stored in these memory banks
is communication data such as email and binary files.
In addition the four-megabyte storage, there are two 512 kilobyte non-volatile flash memory banks. Unlike
the other memory banks, if the power is temporarily lost on the satellite, these banks will not lose their
contents. Both working memory and the large storage banks will be completely erased even for a minuscule
power outage. As the large store banks, these banks will be initially mirroring each other. These memory
banks will be used to store telemetry and other important data. If experiments prove that the mirror memory
configuration is not required, mirroring is turned off by the ground station. Without mirroring, the memory
banks will work in tandem, doubling the storage memory capacity of the system. The working memory,
however, will be unaffected.
The operating software for PANSAT will not be launched with the satellite. Rather, only a small bootstrap
program is located in the system?s read-only memory (ROM). This bootstrap is set up to establish contact
with the ground station, then have the operating system and functional programs uploaded to the satellite.
After uploading, the programs are executed. Only then will PANSAT become an operational communications
facility.
This uploading software concept has the benefit of being able to upload new versions of the software as
required, allowing bug fixes or incorporation of additional features. Unfortunately, if the satellite resets due
to a power loss or some unforeseen error, all the working programs must be reloaded from the ground station.
In fact, if one program is unexpectedly terminated, then that one program needs to be re-uploaded.
Termination means purged from working memory and no other copy of a program exists onboard the
satellite.
The operating system is a multi-threaded kernel made by the BekTek Corporation called SCOS. All the
satellite functional programs execute as threads on top of the operating system. The threads can communicate
with each other using data streams, which are sent via SCOS. Of course, since only one processor is actually
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operating, the multi-threaded environment is obtained by interleaving the thread executions.
The main and largest thread running on PANSAT will be the User Services module. This is the program that
actually performs the communications interface functions for the satellite. Most of the other threads support
the operation of, or interface with, User Services. The scope of the fault-tolerance plan defined later is
centered around, and in terms of, this main software module.
Some redundancy is obtained in the solar panels, sensors and batteries. If one solar panel fails, it will be
discounted by the system. If more than a couple of solar panels fail, however, the satellite will not be able to
generate enough power for the requirements. Thereafter, PANSAT?s performance would be sporadic at best.
If one of the two battery packs fails, the life of the spacecraft is not just halved, but reduced exponentially.
This is due to the life cycle of the batteries depending on full charges and discharges. One battery pack would
not be able to be fully charged before it is started to be drained, thus is would not get the full cycles necessary
for a healthy battery. Finally, failed sensors will simply have to be ignored and not used in telemetry analysis
[Bible and Sakoda, 1998].
These hardware resources listed do provide some fault tolerance, in that most of the subsystems have backups
that can take over if the first element fails. However, if an error less than complete failure occurs, the system
can not gracefully recover from it. Because that level of error handling is not furnished in hardware, it is
necessary to provide that functionality in software, which is the scope of the plan defined herein.
3. Previous Work
Some common methods for fault tolerance cannot be used for PANSAT due to hardware limitations. The
method used most often is called N-version. In this method, several different versions of the same software
are made in complete independence and isolation from each other. The results from each are then compared.
The answer that has the most matches is assumed to be the correct one. Comparing answers this way is called
voting. Voting not only can be used to compare N-versions, but also the exact same software run on different
hardware. For instance, running the same program on multiple processors simultaneously could provide
different results if one processor was faulty [Kreutzfeld, 1997]. PANSAT cannot use N-version or voting
because one processor is running at a time. Also N-version is impractical because of the limited amount of
working RAM, insufficient to spend on multiple versions of the same program.
Another commonly used fault tolerance method is called "recovery blocks" and conducting "acceptance
tests" on the system. At various phases in the program, the entire program state is recorded. If any one of the
acceptance tests fails, the appropriate state is restored, essentially pushing the system time back to that before
the error occurred. If the same state is required to be restored multiple times, an alternate error handling
routine is executed. The alternate method may be anything from running a substitute method, ignoring the
process that generated the error, if possible, or requesting human intervention to correct a procedure
[Kreutzfeld, 1997]. While there is enough slack in the system to perform the acceptance tests, there is neither
enough memory nor extra processing time to keep track of multiple program states. But we can use
acceptance tests in conjunction with other methods.
4. Error Classification
Keeping in mind the hardware restrictions incurred with the PANSAT system, the first step in building the
fault tolerance plan for the satellite is to determine what kinds of problems could occur. It is impossible to
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identify every possible error that could occur, since the circumstances under which these errors occur is
nearly infinite. However, by creating classes of errors, any fault that might arise should fall into one of the
classifications and be properly handled, given the assumption that the error classes are correctly designed
[Kopetz, 1979].
Only after the types of errors have been classified are the tests which identify these errors developed. These
tests, the acceptance tests mentioned above, are created for each and every subsystem in the program which
is being made fault tolerant. The approach is to identify each subsystem and match up all the possible error
classes that could occur in the subsystem. Every possible symptom for each error class is then identified and
a test to detect these symptoms is developed. These tests are the acceptance tests for that subsystem. This
process must be repeated for each subsystem in the program since each has independent behavior and an
error must be isolated as much as possible to aid in correction. Acceptance tests are discussed in more detail
after completing the description of the error classes [Pradhan, 1986].
For the PANSAT project, three error classes are evident. The first type is errors that occur outside of the
scope of the User Services software, system errors. This includes problems with uploaded software, including
the operating system kernel, and system-wide problems. System-wide problems cannot be identified with any
single program, but affect all the software elements. The second kind of errors are problems that could occur
within the User Services program itself, program errors. This includes design as well as incurred errors. The
final error type is data errors. These errors are not execution errors, like the other two types, but problems that
occur with the information utilized or stored by the User Services program. Figure 2 lists the basic error
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User Services livelock
Figure 2: Software Fault-Tolerance Error Classes
While each error class is distinct, the schemes for handling them often overlap. Thus, before error classes are
discussed, the overall scheme for fault detection must be defined. The main method developed for PANSAT
is the Watchdog system, which relates to several of the error classes and often can comprise the entire
solution to the problem. The sole function of Watchdog is to periodically send all operating threads a query
on their status. If no reply or a bad reply is received, Watchdog takes appropriate action. According to initial
estimations, performing the query cycle once every ten minutes should ensure that the system does not get
bogged down performing tests, yet still permit catching important errors before they do damage.
The Watchdog program is unique in its functionality of regulating faulty components in the PANSAT system.
Watchdog interacts with the other elements in the system to identify and error the error. On more systems
with more available resources, a typical monitoring program would function as an arbitrator in the voting
method, previous described. The monitor would evaluate the multiple answers provided by the system and
attempt to choose the correct one. An example of this common monitoring implementation is the Space
Shuttle. On the Space Shuttle, one computer monitors the results of two banks of two computers. If the two
banks agree, the answer is propagated; if the answers disagree, intervention is required and some computers
may be shut down [Lee and Anderson, 1990].
Unfortunately, PANSAT does not have the resource capability to achieve multiple independent answers.
Instead, the Watchdog function oversees activity to isolate an error, then eliminate it. Only then can the
correct answer be determined. Thus, Watchdog?s critical function is to repair the system rather than masking
over erroneous results. This is the only way to overcome faulty behavior in a resource-limited environment.
5. System Errors
The first error class is one of the most disastrous. A complete system crash means the entire system resets or
starts over. This could happen as the result of a power failure, which is hopefully a remote possibility. It is
still a possibility, however, in that it could happen as the result of a traumatic experience, such as the satellite
being hit by a foreign object. Unfortunately, once the system is reset, all volatile memory is reset as well.
This means that the operating system and working threads, including User Services, are erased from memory.
They need to be reloaded from the ground station. The only way that the ground station will become aware
that the software needs to reloaded, or even fixed, is by the lack of responsiveness from the satellite. Once
normal operations begin, all communications with PANSAT will be done directly with the User Services
software, implicitly handled by the operating system. When User Services fails to respond to the ground
station, the ground station can make a connection to the BIOS level of the satellite?s hardware. The BIOS
level connection is restricted to the NPS ground station only. This is the connection mode that the SCOS and
User Services modules are uploaded to the satellite. From this level, the ground station can determine that the
operating system and threads are no longer on the system and need to be reloaded.
Once the software is reloaded, operations can resume. However, all the email and binary files that were
previously sent to PANSAT would be lost, since they will be located in the volatile storage banks. The
telemetry, system settings and log data should not be lost as they are stored in the non-volatile flash memory.
Thus, when the new file system program starts up, it can assume the four-megabyte storage banks are blank
and create a new file structure in that memory block. In the case of the flash memory, however, the file
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system needs to check these banks for an existing file structure. If a proper file data structure exists, the
system should not create a new file structure, but rather incorporate the files that already exist. Once the file
system re-accesses these files, the ground station can download them and view them. Inside these telemetry
and log files may be an indication of the reason of the failure. While a random event, such as being struck by
a foreign object, may not be avoidable, if an internal reason for the failure exists, the ground station may be
able to implement a solution to prevent the failure from repeating. Unfortunately, each system crash must be
handled on a case-by-case basis and involves active intervention on the part of the ground station.
Two more types of disastrous errors are the operating-system-failure and operating-system-livelock error
classes. In terms of a fault-tolerance plan, both error classes are handled identically. Livelock is the condition
where the program is performing an action, but no real progress is being made. An example of this would be
if the program surreptitiously jumps into an infinite loop with no means to exit. The program is working;
there is just no means of accessing it. In both error cases, the symptoms will resemble a system crash to the
ground station: No connection to User Services will be possible. This is due to all communications with the
satellite being directed or channeled by the operating system.
When the ground station enters the BIOS level connection, however, the operator will be able to tell that
SCOS and the threaded programs are still active. Since the operating system has been extensively tested and
used, such an occurrence generally should not be attributed to a bug in the program. More than likely, an
element of the operating system has been altered by a space anomaly. In order to return PANSAT to working
order in the quickest time, SCOS and the operating threads should be terminated at the BIOS level, then
reloaded from the ground station. Just as in the system crash scenario, the flash memory will still retain all its
data. However, in this case, the four-megabyte storage banks will also not have lost any data. The file system
should, instead of creating a new file structure, use the preexisting structure. Once the system has become
operational, there should be no loss of data. The net loss from these errors would be just the operational time
lost before the error was found. Once again, however, this error must be handled manually by the ground
station. The remaining error classes are less traumatic and have solutions that can be, at least in part, handled
by the system itself.
The next error class that might occur would be an error in the Watchdog program itself. As mentioned earlier,
the Watchdog program periodically queries the operating threads. In order to determine when it has errors,
the User Services also serves as the Watchdog?s watchdog. In particular, if the User Services does not get
queried for a period of fifteen minutes (a grace period in addition to the standard polling cycle time), a
software flag is raised. The Watchdog program has either unexpectedly terminated or jumped into its own
livelock condition. In either case, the User Services program continues communications operations as normal.
The first error solving that User Services does, however, is to send a stream to the operating system to restart
the Watchdog, which equates to setting the Watchdog?s program counter to zero. If fifteen minutes after this
stream has been sent to SCOS and no query has been received from the Watchdog program, the User
Services logs the event that the Watchdog is not performing. Since Watchdog?s performance is not critical to
operations, no other programs need to cease. However, during their next connection, the ground station will
be notified that Watchdog needs to be terminated, if it is still resident in memory, and reloaded. With the
program reloaded, operations should continue as normal. In this case, the system tries to handle the error by
restarting the Watchdog program. Only if the error is more complicated than Watchdog can handle does the
ground station need to intervene.
Just as the Watchdog program may crash or go into livelock, the User Services program may do so as well.
The Watchdog program detects either of these two error classes when the User Services program fails to
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respond to the query message. If the operating system reports back to Watchdog that the thread it is trying to
send the query to does not exist, the User Services in this case, Watchdog determines the program has
terminated and is no longer in memory. The Watchdog then logs the error. Next, Watchdog claims the User
Services callsign. By doing this, when the ground station tries to connect into the User Services (the
communications functionality), they will get Watchdog instead, which will simply provide an error message
informing that the User Services needs to be re-uploaded. The benefit of doing this is to lessen the time the
ground station takes in finding the error. Otherwise, the ground station would have to fail trying to connect to
User Services, make a BIOS level connection, then determine the problem from there. This way provides the
error detection up front.
If, however, the operating system believes that the User Services program is still in memory and just not
responding to messages, the User Services thread is probably in livelock. The next step is for the Watchdog
program to request the operating system to reset User Services, as described above. If after a reset, the User
Services module does not respond to the next round of queries, Watchdog logs the fact, then requests
termination of User Services from the operating system. This allows the Watchdog to perform the above
paragraph?s actions just as if the program had already been terminated. Just as in the Watchdog error class,
simple errors may be handled by the system before the ground station is required to intervene to correct a
problem.
That completes the error classes in the system errors group. This fault-tolerance plan centers on the User
Services module, since it is the cornerstone of PANSAT?s operations. However, just like when the User
Services module crashes, Watchdog can detect when any of the other threads that might be on the system fail
or enter a livelock state. Watchdog handles these errors the same way it handles User Services failing. The
exception, however, is that the other threads do not have their own callsigns to connect to. Therefore, the
ground station will have to check the system log entries to find an error in one of these other modules. This is
not a problem however, since the ground station will be downloading the log record during every pass of the
satellite. Since the User Services module should be working perfectly if the error is in another module,
getting and reviewing the log entries would be performed normally.
6. Program Errors
Other errors that might occur are program errors. While the system errors deal with a complete program, or
even the entire PANSAT system, failing, program errors arise within the program itself during execution.
These problems however, do not cause the entire program to fail. Rather, a single component of the program
fails or produces a wrong result while the rest of the program works as expected. Without fault tolerance, the
program would normally continue executing, using the wrong result obtained from the faulty component.
Fault-tolerance techniques are used so that when a wrong result is determined, it is evident and can be
invalidated or corrected. As stated before, the User Services program is the focus of this determination.
The first error class in this type, logic or programming errors, can be found in any program. Ideally, all logic
errors would be identified in the testing phase of program development. Realistically, however, some bugs
will be missed and not found until actual operational use reveals them. Unfortunately, the system will not be
able to tell the difference between this type of error class and the error of program modification by space
anomaly. Program modifications have the consequence of a module that was once providing correct results
now providing faulty results. If the program modification was so severe that it locks the whole program or
livelocks when the procedure is invoked, the error class is no longer within the program error types, but
becomes one of the system error types. Although both the logic error and program modification error have
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different causes, the system only sees the same incorrect results.
These wrong results are generally found in response to a Watchdog query message. When the User Services
program receives a query message, before it replies, it conducts a series of tests to ensure that its subsystems
are performing normally. These tests are the acceptance tests mentioned previously and defined later.
Once a bad subsystem has been identified by the acceptance tests, User Services notifies the Watchdog
program, which logs the problem. The ground station can then review the problem and upload the solution.
Of course, uploading the fix most likely involves gracefully terminating the User Services program and
sending up a fixed version of the code. By performing the graceful termination, the ground station will be
able to preserve all the data on the system. Thus none of the communications files will be lost, minimizing
the impact of the error. If the program errors caused incorrect data to be stored, however, some of the data
may be permanently lost. Meanwhile, if the problem was just a program modification, the code would not
need to be modified from the original form. A logic error would require an updated version of the software to
be created. The ground station is responsible for determining which of the two error classes caused the
problem. This is done by viewing the log data and comparing the results with backups of the satellite
software maintained at the ground station.
While the solution to the error is being handled by the ground station, the satellite may be able to keep
performing, albeit in a diminished mode. The User Services software will maintain a table of subsystems
which correspond to particular services provided by the program. When a subsystem is determined to be
faulty, User Services will simply not use or offer the corresponding service obtained from the table. If the
denied service is mission-critical, such as ability to put data into a transmittable packet, the program will
terminate. If the service is not mission-critical, it will notify users who log into the satellite that a particular
feature is temporarily unavailable, for instance, retrieving the current telemetry might be removed from the
menu list if the telemetry subsystem failed. The goal of handling this error is to provide as much
communications functionality as possible until the problem is rectified.
A special case of the program modification error is the program evaluation subsystem of User Services itself
suffering from a space anomaly. The Watchdog program checks the response sent by the User Services
program. If all of a sudden User Services reports errors in every single one of its subsystems, the error most
likely lies inside the subsystem conducting the testing, not the other parts. In this case, Watchdog logs the
suspected error and keeps operations as usual. The Watchdog program will continue to query User Services,
just to determine if an unexpected termination or livelock occurs. The actual response sent back the User
Services will be ignored, since the testing system would be expected to be flawed.
In all three of the error classes in the program error type, the ground station is required to intervene to correct
the problem. This is due to the programs being held in the volatile working RAM. No copy of the code exists
on the satellite to determine which bits might have been flipped. However the key to this fault-tolerance
technique is that service interruption is kept to a minimum. Early error detection and notification of the
ground station, coupled with temporary work-arounds by the system software itself, allows continued
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The final of the three error class types is data errors. For the most part, the previous errors described were
dealing with the executable part of the program being incorrect or altered. Data errors, on the other hand,
involve the programs working perfectly. The data that is being worked on, however, has been damaged in
some way. This means that most of these errors are detected via the acceptance tests.
The data error with the largest scope is the event of all the files in the storage banks being dumped or erased.
When this occurs, and the User Services program is still executing, a system reset is not the cause of the
storage dump. In this special case, the contents of memory may still be intact, only the file allocation table
(FAT) may have been corrupted. The system will first attempt to reconstruct the FAT from what information
can be found in the memory location where the FAT is normally kept. Aiding in the chances of rebuilding the
FAT is the fact that the FAT is created in duplicate. Thus, out of two corrupted FATs, the possibility exists
for a complete and correct table to be created. Also helping with the recovery of the FAT is the fact the files
are created by User Services in a very methodical way. Only two groups of files exist in mass storage, email
files and binary files. They all use the name scheme of m#### and f####, where # represents a digit from 0 to
9. Conducting a search through the memory banks may reveal the files are still present and reconstructable.
Knowing this and the data structure format of the FAT, there may be enough information obtained to create
new FATs from the files left in memory.
If attempting to recreate the FAT fails, the files are unrecoverable. PANSAT will have to establish a new file
structure in the four-megabyte storage area and start from scratch. For one week after such an incident, any
user who communicates with the satellite will receive a warning message that all data was lost on the date
that it occurred. That way a user can re-upload an email or file as necessary. In either case, the problem is
logged so the ground station can review it. While the ground station cannot restore the files, if the cause of
the problem was more than an isolated incident, the ground station may be able to determine the error source
and fix it.
A less severe data error is the corruption or loss of a single file in storage. Hopefully, since the storage area is
using mirrored files, one of the two storage banks contains a correct version of the file. However, corruption
of a file can still occur in both memory banks. Typically, a corrupted file only has a section of the file lost.
When a file is found to be corrupted, User Services will rebuild the file with all the information that could be
recovered. A marker will be put in the place where the data was lost. For instance, in an email message, the
place with the missing text would be replaced with the "[text missing]" caveat. Additionally, the originator
of the message will be sent an administrative message indicating which message was damaged and indicating
a retransmission may be necessary. Of course, the originator would get this warning in the next
communication with PANSAT. If no discernable data is retrievable from the corrupted file, specifically the
originator of the file, the file is simply deleted from the system. Just as with the file system dump error above,
the ground station is notified of the error for evaluation, but will be unable to do anything more in the
recovery of that particular corrupted file.
While the Watchdog program would determine a problem in the program that managed the logging system, it
would be unable to know if the log file itself had unexpectedly been erased. This is the next type of data
error. Since the log file will be maintained in the non-volatile flash memory, erasing it would most likely be
the result of an inappropriate software action rather than a hardware glitch. When the system-logging
program responds to the query from the Watchdog program, it checks to ensure the contents of the log file are
intact. If not, the Watchdog program is notified. Unfortunately, with the logging system temporarily non-
functional, the Watchdog system is unable to use its primary method of notifying the ground station of errors.
In this special case, the Watchdog program sends the User Services a special message informing it that the
logging system has an error. In its next communication with PANSAT, the User Services will notify the
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ground station of the logging problem.
Note that this procedure is used not only for a problem in the log file, but if the system logging program has a
fault as well. The ground station will have to determine the nature of the error. If the logging program is
faulty, it will be reloaded. If the log file is accidentally deleted, the ground station must determine which
program deleted the log file. This will have to be done via a recreation of the satellite?s environment at the
ground station. As much information about the current state of the satellite will have to be provided by User
Services in order to aid in the recreation process. These errors are a special case in that the normal means of
error notification, and thus error rectifying, is removed from the system. Thus, even though operations
continue for the satellite, the ability to handle and fix any other error that might happen is drastically reduced
until the logging system error is fixed.
The final error class identified for the PANSAT project is the corruption of a program data structure used
within the User Services program. The User Services program functions as an automata state machine, acting
on data from an end user based on what state the system is in for that particular user. Thus, if a data structure
becomes corrupted, a user connection may act unpredictably. Fortunately, the corrupting of a data structure
will most likely affect only a single user; the other connections will be unaffected. Once a data structure is
determined to be corrupt, there is a good chance that it can be rebuilt. The operating system provides much of
the state information as it delivers a packet of data received from the user to the User Services program.
Thus, using that information, much of data maintained about the connection can be determined. If, however,
a complete data structure cannot be rebuilt from the data provided, the User Services needs to interrupt the
connection by sending the user a series of interrogative messages. After these messages are sent, the program
should put the connection back into the default state, and should print out the main menu of choices for the
user to pick. The user would then be responsible for salvaging the session and retrying to complete the work
that was ongoing at the time of the fault.
As with all other data errors, the corrupt data structure error will be logged and as much data will be
recovered as possible. The ground station will be notified of the error, but will not be able to fix that
particular instance. Using the data, however, a solution to the problem that created the data loss in the first
place may be determined, hopefully eliminating future errors of the same kind.
This concludes the classification and handling of errors that PANSAT might see. Although each specific
error that might occur is not detailed in this plan, most likely any error that arises will fall into one of the
error classes and be handled appropriately. No matter what, PANSAT always has the BIOS level connection
which can be used to reset the system to start over. If for some reason this connection is unable to be made,
the satellite has suffered a major catastrophe and, for all practical purposes, is dead. While there can be no
mechanism to handle this type of an error, the likelihood of this happening is small.
8. Acceptance Tests
When discussing the program and data errors above, it was taken for granted that these errors would be
detected by the acceptance tests mentioned. As mentioned previously, without a complete idea of the errors to
create the tests for, the acceptance tests can not be fully designed. Once the error class plan is formulated,
however, it is possible to develop the precise tests to fulfill the plan. As implied above, the acceptance tests
should test all of the subsystems and data organizations to determine their reliability and integrity [Pradhan,
1986]. Figure 3 shows the four types of acceptance tests the PANSAT User Services program will perform to
conduct a self-evaluation. Each one of the classifications is discussed in the following the table.
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Figure 3: Fault-tolerance Acceptance Test Classifications
The first acceptance test type is satisfaction of requirements. This means the subsystem provides the expected
results. Naturally, each subsystem will have a different method for checking its results. A standard means for
procedures that take data in, process it, and return an answer is to use table comparison. Obviously, it is
impossible and impractical to maintain a list of all legitimate answers for any given input. Rather, when the
Watchdog program?s query message is received, the User Services testing procedure refers to a table of
predefined tests for each subsystem. There should be only one or two tests per subsystem or the program
could get bogged down performing all the tests. The tests, however, should be a good representation of the
type of calculations required by the system. Included in the table is the correct answer the subsystem should
return for the test. Any variance between the table answer and the subsystem provided result would be a logic
or program modification error, as described above, and reported to the Watchdog system.
This type of comparison test is used on the subsystem which performs the packetizing of data. All data sent
from the satellite must be in AX.25 packet format. By providing preselected raw data to the procedure that
forms these packets, then comparing the format of the packet to what is expected, a determination of a flaw
arising in the procedure is be achieved. Additionally, the comparison test is performed on the data
compression/decompression algorithm. A set of compressed data is sent to the procedure to see if the correct
data is extracted, and vice-a-versa. Finally, the position-determination routine is tested with this technique.
The routine takes an initial position and a change in time since the position and produces the current position.
The comparison test table contains all three elements to determine the position routine accuracy.
If the subsystem is not answer-based, but rather performance-based, the User Services could check that the
action performed was actually the expected result. While the answer-based checking would be done only in
response of a Watchdog query message, the performance-based procedures would be checked after the
completion of every action.
On PANSAT, the system that saves a file into the storage memory banks is be checked by determining
whether the file name and size of the newly created object is the same as that provided to the file system.
Once again, a mismatch would be classified as either logic error or program modification error. Additionally,
when an entry is sent to the event logging subsystem, the event log file is checked to ensure the entry was
appended to the end of the file. The defragmentation module also uses a performance-based satisfaction test.
After a file has been defragmented, the file data is looked up in the FAT to ensure that it is now taking up on
contiguous block in storage.
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The second kind of acceptance tests are accounting tests. That is, User Services keeps a tally of certain
information about the rest of the system. When a particular subsystem is queried about its tally, if it does not
match User Services?s version, an error is declared.
Accounting tests are used to compare a file counter held by User Services with a directory count provided by
the file system. A variation in the number could indicate a corrupted FAT, which is handled as a dump of the
file system error. In addition to that procedure, the number of packets returned from the packetizing system
for a certain sized block of data should be a predetermined amount. A variation would be a logic or program
modification error. Next, a timestamp is placed on all recorded activities of the User Services program, such
as saved files, transmitted packets, or positional estimates. If the timestamps are not ordered, the system?s
clock interface system may be flawed. Finally, connection records are checked to ensure that the number of
in use records matches a counter which indicates the number of ongoing connections. If the numbers differ, a
connection has been lost. The handler for a data structure integrity violation is invoked.
The next acceptance test type is called reasonable tests. This name says it all: whether the system provides a
reasonable result. This is the most common acceptance test and is used with almost every subsystem in the
User Services package.
For instance, this test is used when telemetry values are obtained. Each value procured has a possible value
range located in a table. If the value is outside of the range, or the value has changed within the range, but at a
rate that is not physically possible, then the means of getting the values or the sensor providing the value may
be faulty. Manifestly, if a user requests an operation that does not make sense, the operation should be
rejected and a warning sent back to the user. If data returned from a function is not the correct size, it is
faulty. This includes the size of packet received from SCOS to the length of a datastream connecting
processes. A position returned by the dead-reckoning procedure must be within a range of possible positions
on the satellite?s orbit. A position of the North Pole would be flagged as faulty since PANSAT?s orbit does
not come close to the North Pole. Finally, settings commands received from the ground station must make
sense. That is, the settings must correspond to feasible operations. For example, performing an auto-purge of
the storage banks every minute is not a practicable operation.
The last kind of acceptance tests are labeled computer run-time checks. These are handling typical run-time
errors that usually cause a program to terminate. Also called exception handling, these functions catch divide
by zero, overflow, underflow, and other errors by abstracting their operation into a single safe procedure. By
trapping their execution, the program will continue to execute, and the subsystem that requested the illegal
operation can be determined. This is implemented by placing all the exception routines into a single checked
module. Once the module is proven safe from crashing, any element that uses the module is safe from
crashing due to checked run-time error. It is important to keep the program from terminating since, as
mentioned before, once the program terminates, it is removed from memory. Removal would prohibit
determination of the offending subsystem and make harder the fixing of the error.
Another run-time check is for each procedure to check the program stack upon being called. If the stack is not
formatted correctly, the procedure may have been illegally jumped to. A correct stack format would be
indicated by the proper type and number of parameters being placed on the stack. It may be impossible to
determine where to resume execution from when returning from an improperly called function, so a safety
point of reference, the main menu in this case, may have to be jumped to in order to continue execution.
These acceptance tests are very specific to the individual subsystem that they are evaluating or protecting.
The basic concepts presented here form a comprehensive coverage for many systems, however. When
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developing a list of tests, every subsystem should be evaluated. In general this type of fault-tolerance plan
increases the overall work load by 25 percent, an acceptable amount.
9. Conclusions
None of the technologies applied in this fault-tolerance plan are difficult in and of themselves. However their
application in conjunction provides integrated comprehensive coverage, which dramatically increases the
reliability of PANSAT. As mentioned at the beginning, most fault-tolerance research has been working with
distributed systems, working with a large pool of hardware resources [Kreutzfeld, 1997]. Unfortunately, the
particulars of space, especially in this project, preclude the use of most of those features. The methods
instituted on PANSAT are tried and true fault-tolerance methods, only they have not been previously linked
together to form a consolidated fault protection for a system. Using this innovative plan, the satellite should
be able to operate and provide a level of reliability expected by the military for a communications satellite.
Limited resource fault tolerance can be successfully implemented. While it may not provide the same level of
self-correction that is expected of a large resource system, the errors are still trapped and handled by the
limited system, with a little bit more of an active role by the ground station.
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